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* Abstract
This paper examines the factors associated with the decision of local police depart-
ments in the United States to operate specialized drug units or to participate in multi-
jurisdictional drug task forces. Combining data from the Law Enforcement Manage-
ment and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey, the 2000 Census, and the Uni-
form Crime Report, we use both bivariate and multivariate methods to conduct the 
analysis. The findings indicate that county-level agencies, those with other formalized 
drug control efforts, high levels of violent crime, high degrees of task specialization 
and formalization, and high proportions of the resident population accounted for by 
renters were more likely to operate drug units, participate in multi-agency drug task 
forces, and allocate more officers per capita to these efforts.
This article is based on a paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Society of 
Criminology,  St. Louis, Missouri, November 12, 2008.
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Beginning in the mid-1980s with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 
and 1988, the United States dedicated unprecedented resources to the control of 
illicit drug use, sales, and distribution. This new emphasis resulted in a dramatic 
increase in arrests for drug law violations, with the number of arrests for drug 
crimes almost doubling between 1985 and 1995, jumping from approximately 
800,000 to almost 1.5 million (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005). By 2006, the 
annual number of arrests for drug law violations in the United States rose even 
further, exceeding 1.8 million (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). The Office 
of National Drug Control Policy (2004, p. vi) estimates that the societal costs of 
drug abuse exceeded $180.9 billion in 2002, with nearly $9 billion of these costs 
being borne by law enforcement agencies. 
 While most agree that controlling the drug problem requires involving the 
public health and educational systems, the criminal justice system is often the first 
to respond to emerging drug problems. How law enforcement agencies target drug 
law violations and drug markets varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and can 
include everything from preventative efforts, such as the Drug Abuse Resistance 
Education program (DARE), to long-term, organized, and focused drug investiga-
tions involving specialized drug units within police departments and/or participa-
tion in multi-jurisdictional drug task forces. The goal of this research is to under-
stand why local law enforcement agencies may operate their own specialized drug 
unit and/or participate in a multi-agency drug task force. 
 Drug control efforts are typically categorized as either demand reduction or 
supply reduction strategies. Demand reduction strategies aim at preventing the use 
of drugs through education and treatment, or deterrence through the risk of arrest 
and prosecution. Supply reduction strategies target the availability of drugs and 
involve a wide range of activities, including crop eradication, border interdiction, 
and street-level enforcement. The law enforcement response is typically hierar-
chical. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Homeland Security investigate inter-
national and interstate trafficking rings, while state and local police departments 
typically interrupt the supply of drugs within states and at the street level. This hi-
erarchical response has led many police departments to form specialized drug units 
to target mid-level drug wholesalers and dealers, many of whom would otherwise 
fall through the cracks because of the difference between federal practices and the 
street-level focus of uniformed law enforcement (Olson, 2005, p. 183).
 Specialized police drug enforcement efforts typically take two forms: full-time 
specialized drug enforcement units within local police departments and participa-
tion in multi-agency drug task forces. In general, local law enforcement agency drug 
units limit their drug enforcement efforts to their specific geographic jurisdiction and 
carry out more sophisticated investigations than traditional patrol strategies involv-
ing on-view arrests. Multi-agency task forces also tend to carry out more sophisti-
cated investigations and more targeted drug enforcement efforts, but carry out their 
investigative work across multiple participating jurisdictions.  Despite the potential 
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benefit of in-house drug units and drug task force participation as a law enforcement 
response to the drug problem, we know very little about how police departments 
decide which strategy to use, or how many officers they assign to these efforts.
 Across local law enforcement agencies in the United States, the operation of 
specialized drug units and participation in multi-agency drug task forces is not that 
widespread. According to Hickman and Reaves (2006), only 18% of all local police 
departments in the United States in 2003 assigned officers full-time to a special-
ized drug enforcement unit within their agency, and only about one quarter (23%) 
assigned officers full-time to a multi-agency drug task force. Still, the number of 
multi-agency drug task forces operating in the United States increased dramatically 
during the mid- to late-1980s largely because of the financial support provided by 
the federal government. The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988 provided 
substantial amounts of money to state and local units of government to develop 
and operate multi-jurisdictional drug task forces. For example, between 1989 and 
1994, the Bureau of Justice Assistance allocated more than $700 million in federal 
block grant funds to drug task force efforts, accounting for 40% of the total law 
enforcement block grant distributions (Dunworth, Hayes, & Saiger, 1997, p. 5). 
 The impact of the application of federal funds to the drug problem was sub-
stantial. State and local police agencies created more than 700 drug task forces be-
tween 1986 and 1993 (Coldren, 1993). By 1998, more than 1,000 drug task forces 
were operating in the United States, and more than 5,800 local police officers were 
assigned full time to these drug task forces (Reaves and Goldberg, 2000, p. iii). 
These 5,800 officers assigned to multi-agency drug task forces amounted to nearly 
twice the number of the agents employed by the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001). No less significant were the 13,600 officers as-
signed to specialized drug units within local police departments. 
 Further, recent research points to aggregate changes in the level of commit-
ment to these drug units and task forces, at least among police departments serv-
ing large jurisdictions (more than 250,000 residents). For example, the average 
number of officers assigned to specialized drug units in big city police departments 
increased 43% between 1990 and 2000, to an average of 123 officers per depart-
ment, although as a percentage of all officers these assignments actually decreased 
(Hickman & Reeves, 2002, p. 7). A much smaller increase, however, was seen in 
the assignment of officers to drug task forces: The average number of officers per 
department climbed only 15% between 1990 and 2000, from an average of 13 to 
15 full-time officers per department. 
 What factors determine whether a police department will operate a drug unit 
or participate in a multi-agency task force, and how many officers they assign to 
these efforts? One would expect that this decision would be based, at least in part, 
upon the size of the law enforcement agency. Those agencies that have a drug 
problem but are too small to support a dedicated drug unit would seem to be likely 
candidates for participation in a drug task force. Research, however, has shown 
that complex organizations make decisions for other than rational purposes. In 
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his examination of the organizational and environmental factors surrounding 
the establishment of a gang unit within a Midwestern police department, Katz 
(2001, p. 66) found that the department created a gang unit because of institution-
al considerations—the pressures placed on police officials from various powerful 
elements within the community—and not a rational need.  
 The current study will investigate the characteristics associated with the opera-
tion of police drug units and participation in multi-agency drug task forces across 
local law enforcement agencies in the United States. Drug units were chosen for 
two reasons. First, they represent a response to a contemporary police problem. 
Second, unlike police gang units, little research has been conducted into the estab-
lishment of police drug units. Although little attention has been paid to the factors 
associated with formal, organizational responses to drug enforcement by local law 
enforcement agencies, there is a substantial body of literature that has examined 
the factors that affect the organizational features of police departments. 
* Literature Review: Factors Affecting Organizational Features of 
 Police Departments
Ever since the Wickersham Commission (1931) called for the removal of politics 
from policing, law enforcement agencies throughout the United States have utilized 
organizational theory to improve their operations. From the early use of principles 
of scientific management, to modern, computerized command and control tech-
niques, police agencies have ceaselessly worked to provide better service to the pub-
lic. One of the most common methods of improving police service has been the use 
of differentiation. Differentiation refers to the subdivision of responsibilities. Police 
departments have routinely used task specialization, division of labor, and hierar-
chical organization to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations.  
 In his pioneering study of work organizations, Blau (1970, p. 204) argued 
that increasing organizational size generates structural change among various di-
mensions. He identified these dimensions as occupational, functional, hierarchical, 
and spatial differentiation. According to Blau (1970, p. 216), explicit procedures 
exist within an organization for systematically subdividing the work necessary to 
achieve the organization’s goals. Different tasks are assigned to different positions; 
specialized functions are allocated to various divisions and sections; branches are 
created in dispersed locations; and administrative responsibilities are subdivided 
among staff personnel and managers on various levels. 
 Langworthy (2002, p. 33) applied Blau’s typology to police organizations. He 
defines occupational differentiation as the degree to which a police department 
employs specialists such as civilian 911 dispatchers, detectives, and other specially 
trained personnel. Functional differentiation is the degree to which police orga-
nizations respond to their task environment by creating specialized units, such as 
drug units. Hierarchical differentiation, also referred to as vertical differentiation, 
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refers to the height of the organization—the rank structure. Spatial differentiation 
is the degree to which a police organization’s territory is divided into units—the 
number of precincts and substations.
 In an often-quoted review of the organizational literature, Maguire (1997, 
p. 550) adds three additional dimensions to the core elements of police organi-
zational structure—centralization, formalization, and administration. He defines 
centralization as the extent to which the decision-making capacity of an organiza-
tion is concentrated in a single individual or a small, select group. Langworthy 
(2002, p. 34) notes that centralization can take two forms: spatial and authority. 
Spatial centralization is similar to spatial differentiation, while authority central-
ization refers to the degree to which decision-making authority is distributed or 
attenuated. For example, the presence of a community policing program would in-
dicate an attempt to decentralize decision-making authority within a police depart-
ment. Formalization is simply defined as the degree to which an organization is 
governed by formal (written) rules. Lastly, administration refers to the proportion 
of available resources committed to administrative functions, such as the number 
of supervisors and the number of administrative support units. 
 Environmental factors also influence police organization. Research suggests 
that the size of the population served is related to the structure of many police 
departments. In an analysis published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Hick-
man and Reaves (2006, p. 15) found that the larger the population served, the 
more likely the jurisdiction was to employ both types of formal drug enforcement 
efforts—full-time drug units within the police department and full-time participa-
tion in a multi-agency drug task force. However, the authors did not examine the 
extent to which other agency or community characteristics were associated with 
the operation of a drug unit or participation in a drug task force.
 Another factor shaping police organization is available resources. It takes 
money to establish a drug unit and to provide officers to participate in a drug 
task force. If we view police departments as rational organizations, we would 
expect that they would establish drug units in response to the drug problem in 
their jurisdiction, as long as they could afford the expense. Ratcliffe and Guidetti 
(2008, p. 10), however, write that the demands placed on the police have already 
far outstripped the resources available to them. They offer as evidence of declin-
ing resources the fact that police in the U. S. and the United Kingdom have looked 
to new methods to reduce crime, such as intelligence-led policing and computer-
assisted crime control strategies such as COMPSTAT, to compensate for their in-
ability to increase the number of available officers. If local police departments do 
not have the resources to fund drug control efforts, one would assume that they 
would look to new strategies, such as participation in a multi-jurisdictional drug 
task force, in order to address the drug problem in their area.  
 Some have suggested that asset forfeiture could be used to support drug en-
forcement activities. In 2003, $93,000 per sworn officer was spent in operational 
costs, but the median value of money, goods, and property received from asset 
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forfeiture was only $7,000 per agency (Hickman & Reaves, 2006). Although for-
feiture can be used to fund investigations, personnel salaries are generally the re-
sponsibility of the law enforcement agency. Additionally, a recent national study 
conducted by Worrall and Kovandzic (2008, p. 239) using LEMAS data found 
that crime control was more important to police agencies than revenue generation 
through asset forfeiture. This suggests that police departments do not enter nar-
cotic enforcement to generate money. 
 We would also expect police departments to establish drug control efforts in re-
sponse to the crime problem in their jurisdictions given the established relationship 
between drugs and crime. Drugs are related to crime in two ways. First, it is a crime 
to possess, sell, or distribute drugs unless licensed to do so. Second, drug use is re-
lated to crime because of the potential influence it can have on the user’s behavior. 
For example, based on a 2004 survey of prison inmates, it was estimated that 17% 
of state prison inmates and 18% of federal inmates committed their current offense 
to obtain money for drugs (Mumola & Karberg, 2006, p. 1). Further, violence has 
also been found to exist among those involved in the illicit drug trade. Writing for 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Spiess and Fallow (2000, p. 4) report 
that the drug trade causes violence because of the competition for drug markets 
and drug customers, disputes among individuals involved in the drug trade, and the 
tendency toward violence by the individuals who participate in the drug trade. 
 Like agency characteristics, community characteristics have also been found to 
be related to the structure of police organizations and levels of crime in communi-
ties. One such characteristic is population density. The role of population density 
in the generation or suppression of crime has been the subject of debate for some 
time (Harries, 2006, p. 1). The classic argument is that high density leads to higher 
residential crime rates. There are more residential burglaries, domestic assaults, 
larcenies, and auto thefts where there are more people and more things to steal. 
More crime leads to more police. On the other hand, densely populated areas offer 
natural surveillance that has the effect of inhibiting violent crime, in that witnesses 
are more abundant and events are more likely to be reported to the police. More 
reported crime could lead to more police even when there is no increase in the ac-
tual volume of crime. Higher population density also leads to higher levels of drug 
abuse, as reported by Flowers (1999, p. 68), who found that patterns of drug use, 
as indicated by urinalyses of male arrestees, were highest in urban areas. 
 Similarly, the percentage of home ownership has been found to be related to 
crime. In fact, Dietz (2003, p. 13) reports that home ownership is the second most 
important predictor of victimization after income. If the lack of home ownership 
leads to victimization, one would assume that police would have to increase 
crime control efforts as home ownership declined. Additionally, Page-Adams and 
Sherraden (1996) found that the children of homeowners are less likely to have 
alcohol and substance abuse problems. It could, therefore, be argued that fewer 
substance abuse problems in a community will have a direct effect on police or-
ganizational structure. 
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* Why Organizational Characteristics Affect Enforcement Policy
Researchers have put forward a number of theories to explain why organizational 
characteristics affect police enforcement policies. They include rational systems 
theory (Scott, 1981), contingency theory (Lawrence & Lorch, 1967), resource de-
pendency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967), 
and institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). All are believed to affect the 
formal structure of police organizations.
 Rational Systems Theory
 Early management theorists viewed organizations as “rational systems” 
(Scott, 1981) designed for the efficient achievement of a group’s goals. The ratio-
nal systems perspective was at the heart of early twentieth century police reform. 
Weary of political interference and hoping to take advantage of advances in sci-
entific management, police departments used rational systems theory to develop 
the professional model of policing. Sometimes called the reform model, the pro-
fessional model of policing centralized authority, created specialized crime-fight-
ing units, shifted officers from foot to motorized patrol, and introduced radio 
technology. Activities and personnel were organized by clientele, type of service, 
time of day, and geography, all to ensure the efficient delivery of police service. 
Rational systems theory would argue that specialized police drug units are a di-
rect response to a demonstrated need—a response that is best addressed through 
differentiation and accountability. 
 Contingency Theory
 Although contingency theory was originally envisioned as separate from ra-
tional systems theory, researchers have come to view it as complementary to the 
rational systems perspective (Greenwood, 2008, p. 51). What makes these two 
theories similar is the fact that they both argue that changes in the organization of 
work are directly related to changes in the task environment. The rational systems 
perspective holds that functional differentiation is a direct, bureaucratic response 
to a demonstrated need. Contingency theory differs in that it views an organiza-
tion’s response as a product of the proper fit between organizational design and 
environmental exigencies. Factors such as the size of a community, population 
composition, and the nature and extent of the crime problem may all influence 
the decision to modify an organization’s structure (Kuykendall & Roberg, 1982, 
p. 243). As such, contingency theory would argue that it may take more than a 
rational need to create a police drug enforcement unit. 
 Resource Dependency Theory
 Resource dependency theory is also related to an organization’s task environ-
ment, but differs from rational systems theory and contingency theory in its focus 
on structures and behaviors that sustain the flow of resources independent of the 
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rational need. In other words, police departments are likely to create specialized 
units because resources are available from the state and federal government even 
though they may not have the designated crime problem. Although there is no 
resource dependency research bearing directly on the issue of police drug units, 
Maguire (1997, p. 554) found that the reason many police agencies implemented 
community policing was really to receive a share of the $8.8 billion available from 
the federal COPS program--which allowed them to hire new police officers—and 
not necessarily a need for, or a commitment to, community policing. 
 Racial Threat Theory
 Derived from the conflict paradigm, racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967) ar-
gues that whites perceive the increased presence and visibility of minority groups 
as both an economic and political threat. Liska and Chamlin (1984) extend 
this theory to include the threat of black crime. The threat of black crime hy-
pothesis asserts that social control will increasingly be directed against blacks 
as their population grows larger in size and as black-on-white crime increases. 
Research following this tradition suggests that the racial threat hypothesis also 
affects police organization. In a sampling of 90 U. S. cities, Jackson and Carroll 
(1981, p. 303) found that police expenditures expanded when a minority group 
appeared threatening to the dominant population. In a similar study, Liska, 
Lawrence, and Benson (1981, p. 424) found that dramatic increases in police de-
partment size, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, could not be accounted for 
in terms of reported crime rates alone. Instead, they argue that these increases 
were influenced by the relative size of racially dissimilar groups associated with 
street crime.  
 Institutional Theory
 Institutional theory, like resource dependency theory, argues that the struc-
ture and activities of an organization do not always reflect rational adaptations 
to environmental problems. Institutional theorists believe that the structure and 
activities of an organization reflect the values and beliefs of powerful actors called 
sovereigns (mayors, council members, special interest groups), who have the abil-
ity to influence the policies of the organization. Crank and Langworthy (1992, p. 
338) applied institutional theory to policing, arguing that police departments in 
the United States are highly institutionalized organizations shaped by powerful 
myths in their environment. Myths are untested ideas and beliefs that many believe 
to be true. The incorporation of these accepted myths enables police departments 
to attain legitimacy. With legitimacy comes stability and protection from outside 
interference by powerful actors, who have the ability to shape the institutional 
environment. As such, institutional theory would argue that the establishment of 
a police drug unit could have more to do with the fact that police departments are 
expected to have a drug enforcement unit than the actual extent of the drug abuse 
problem in a community.
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* Research Question
We hypothesize that there are specific features and characteristics of police organi-
zations, and the communities they serve, that affect their decision to operate a po-
lice drug unit and participate in a multi-agency drug task force. We argue that the 
decision by police departments to employ these drug control strategies is a function 
of three general groups of factors including: 1) the organizational structure and 
characteristics of the law enforcement agency, 2) the size and characteristics of the 
population and jurisdiction served, and 3) the extent and nature of the drug and 
crime problem. Thus, the general models we intend to develop and use to test this 
hypothesis can be described as follows:
Model 1: Operation of a Full-Time Drug Unit ƒ [Agency Structure + Agen-
cy Resources & Characteristics + Size of Jurisdiction + Population Charac-
teristics + Drug and Violent Crime Problem]
Model 2: Per-Capita Officers Assigned to Drug Unit ƒ [Agency Structure 
+ Agency Resources & Characteristics + Size of Jurisdiction + Population 
Characteristics + Drug and Violent Crime Problem]
Model 3: Participation in a Multi-Agency Drug Task Force ƒ [Agency 
Structure + Agency Resources & Characteristics + Size of Jurisdiction + 
Population Characteristics + Drug and Violent Crime Problem]
Model 4: Per-Capita Officers Assigned to a Multi-Agency Drug Task Force 
ƒ [Agency Structure + Agency Resources & Characteristics + Size of Juris-
diction + Population Characteristics + Drug and Violent Crime Problem]
Summarized in the next section are the data sources and specific measures used to 
operationalize the dependent and independent variables described above. 
* Data and Methods
In order to examine this hypothesis, we obtained and combined data from three 
different and separate information sources: the 2003 Law Enforcement Manage-
ment and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey, the 2000 Decennial Census, 
and the 2003 Uniform Crime Report (UCR) program. The LEMAS survey collects 
a wide variety of information from a representative sample of law enforcement 
agencies in the United States every three years, including information about staff-
ing, budget, programs, and policies. LEMAS also collects data on the number of 
full-time officers assigned to drug enforcement units and the number assigned to 
multi-agency drug task forces. The strengths and weaknesses of using the LEMAS 
data as a platform for comparative research involving police departments is de-
scribed in detail by Langworthy (2002). While Langworthy argues that LEMAS 
is an extraordinary vehicle for collecting police data, he recognizes that work is 
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needed on calls for service, beat enumerations, and an explication of agency rank 
structure, none of which affect this analysis. In addition, data available from the 
2000 Census were obtained and used to measure the characteristics of the popula-
tion served by the police departments in the LEMAS sample, including resident age, 
race, and housing characteristics. Finally, data available from the UCR program 
provided information on the number of violent Index crimes reported to each of 
the police departments, as well as the number of arrests for drug law violations. 
 In order to match the data from the LEMAS survey, the Census, and the UCR, 
we used a cross-walk program provided by the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). This program allowed us to link the agency 
identification number used in the LEMAS survey with the Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) codes used in the Census, and the Originating Agency 
Identifier (ORI) codes used in the UCR data. Out of the 2,791 municipal and 
county police departments included in the 2003 LEMAS survey, our final sample 
consisted of the 2,425 (86%) agencies for which we were able to obtain and merge 
both Census and UCR data.
 Dependent Variables
 As described earlier, our primary interest is in examining how the decision by 
local law enforcement agencies to operate a full-time drug unit or to participate full-
time in a multi-agency drug task force is related to the organizational structure and 
characteristics of law enforcement agencies, the size and characteristics of the popula-
tion and jurisdiction served, and the extent and nature of the drug and crime problem. 
From the LEMAS survey, we created a dichotomous variable to indicate whether each 
agency included in our sample assigned one or more full-time officers to an in-house 
drug unit. The departments that did not have a full-time drug unit were coded as 0 
in the analyses that follow, and departments that did have a full-time drug unit were 
coded as 1 (0 = no full-time drug unit, 1 = full-time drug unit). Similarly, data from the 
LEMAS survey were recoded to identify those departments in the sample that did and 
did not have at least one officer assigned full-time to a multi-agency drug task force (0 
= no officers assigned full-time to a multi-agency drug task force, 1 = officers assigned 
full-time to a multi-agency drug task force).  In addition to measuring the existence of 
an in-house drug unit or participation in a multi-agency drug task force (i.e., dichoto-
mous measures), we also wanted to examine the relative amount of resources/officers 
committed to each of these drug control approaches. Thus, we also computed the per-
capita number of full-time officers assigned to an in-house drug unit and the per-capita 
number of full-time officers assigned to a multi-agency drug task force.
 In order to produce the national estimates of drug unit operation and participa-
tion in drug task forces, Hickman & Reaves (2006) used weighted responses to the 
LEMAS survey, resulting in a national estimate of 18% of all agencies having a drug 
unit and 23% of agencies participating in a multi-agency drug task force. Given our 
research questions, we did not weight the survey responses, and the unweighted data 
indicated that 41% of the local police departments contained in our sample main-
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tained a full-time, specialized drug enforcement unit, and 48% contributed full-time 
officers to multi-agency drug task forces. As seen in Table 1, the mean number of 
per-capita officers assigned to drug units by police departments in the sample was 
4.6 per 100,000 residents, but the distribution was highly skewed. Similarly, the 
mean number of per-capita officers assigned to multi-agency drug task forces by 
police departments in the sample was 3.9, and was also highly skewed (Table 1).
* Operationalization of Independent Variables
As our review has shown, organizational changes within a police department, and 
differences across departments, are related to a number of diverse factors, includ-
ing agency resources, organizational characteristics, jurisdiction size, community 
characteristics, and the level of crime. The following summarizes the operational-
ization of the independent variables we included in the analyses within these cat-
egories. The descriptive statistics of each measure are presented in Table 1, along 
with the theoretical perspective each variable attempts to measure.
 Agency Resources
 We used LEMAS data to measure agency resources. Specifically, we measured 
agency resources by computing the per-capita budget for each agency using the 
LEMAS annual (2003) budget variable and Census data on the population served 
by the agency. As seen in Table 1, across the 2,425 police agencies contained in 
our sample, the mean budget was $175 per resident, although the distribution was 
positively skewed. The median per-capita expenditure was $148. An alternative 
indicator of available resources—per-capita police officers—could also have been 
used; however, this measure was so highly correlated with per-capita expenditures 
that per-capita expenditures was chosen for the analyses to avoid redundancy and 
multicolinearity.1
 Organizational Characteristics
 We operationalized organizational characteristics by measuring the degree of 
agency formalization, centralization, and task specialization. We accomplished this 
by utilizing a number of different questions found in the LEMAS survey, including 
 1When the correlation between per-capita expenditures and officers per capita was ex-
amined, both Pearson’s r and Spearman’s rho were high and statistically significant. Pearson’s 
r equaled .97, p < .001, and Spearman’s rho equaled .71, p < .001. Due to the highly skewed 
nature of these measures, Spearman’s rho is the more appropriate non-parametric test to 
measure correlation. When these data were weighted using the weights developed by the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics to produce national estimates, the correlations were still exceedingly 
high and statistically significant: r = .98, p < .001, Spearman’s rho = .68, p < .001.
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the number of formal written policies, the existence of separate policing districts or 
precincts, the existence of a formal community policing plan, and the proportion 
of agency employees accounted for by civilians, but we also recognize the concerns 
raised by Langworthy (2002) regarding the potential limitations of operational-
izing these concepts from available LEMAS data. 
 Included in the LEMAS survey were questions that sought to determine the exis-
tence of formal, written policy directives for 15 different issues, ranging from the use 
of deadly force to interacting with the media. While these 15 issues represent a small 
number of items (Langworthy, 2002), they do cover a wide range of topics. Affirma-
tive responses to the existence of these individual policies were totaled for each agency 
in the sample to produce one measure of the degree of agency formalization. As seen 
in Table 1, the mean number of written policies reported was 12 out of a possible 15. 
Roughly, 19% of the agencies included in the sample indicated that they had policies 
for all 15 of the specific questions asked in the LEMAS survey, and less than 10% of 
the sample indicated that they had fewer than 8 of the formal policies asked.   
 The degree of centralization/decentralization of police operations was mea-
sured using the LEMAS question regarding the number of districts, precincts, or 
division stations that the department operated separate from headquarters. The 
agency responses were recoded into a dichotomous variable, and as seen in Table 
1, 29% of the sample departments had one or more of these “district sub-units” 
operating separately from police headquarters. Whether or not the police depart-
ments in our sample had a formal community policing program was also used as 
a proxy for the degree of centralization/decentralization. As seen in Table 1, based 
on information reported to the LEMAS survey, 23% of the agencies included in 
our sample indicated that they did have such a plan. 
 The literature examining police organizational features points to the fact that 
higher degrees of task specialization are helpful in understanding how departments 
are organized and carry out their missions. Included in the LEMAS survey are 
questions regarding the operation of specific specialized units; however, these ques-
tions are only asked of a subset of agencies (referred to as the long form), and 
analyses of these responses suggest that larger agencies are more likely to receive 
the long form, resulting in a highly biased subsample. However, another measure 
that can be used to measure task specialization is the proportion of full-time em-
ployees accounted for by civilian personnel. These data were available for all agen-
cies included in the sample we examined. As seen in Table 1, across the agencies 
included in the sample, the ratio of full-time authorized civilian personnel to full-
time authorized sworn officers averaged .20 to 1, indicating that across the sample 
there was roughly 1 full-time civilian for every 5 sworn officers.
 The last agency characteristic we included in the analyses was a variable to dis-
tinguish between county/sheriff’s offices and municipal police departments. Coun-
ty/sheriff’s often serve as the “lead” law enforcement agency in each county, and 
may be responsible for a much wider array of law enforcement services, includ-
ing drug enforcement. To distinguish between municipal police departments and 
58   •   JusticE REsEARch AnD POLicy
county/sheriff’s police departments, we coded municipal police departments 0 and 
county/sheriff’s police departments as 1. In our sample, just over one third (36%) 
were county/sheriff’s police departments and the remaining 64% were municipal 
departments (Table 1).
 Characteristics of the Jurisdiction and Population Served
 The literature and our hypothesized model suggest that the following charac-
teristics influence the organizational responses and structure of police departments: 
the sheer size of the jurisdiction served, the population density of the community, 
and the population and housing characteristics. The following summarizes the 
sources of information used to measure these characteristics, and provides a sum-
mary of these characteristics for the sample of agencies included in our analyses.
 Jurisdiction size was measured by using the total population of the jurisdiction 
served by the law enforcement agencies included in our sample. These data were 
derived from the 2000 census. Within our sample of 2,425 local law enforcement 
agencies, the average population served was just over 112,000, although the medi-
an was just under 28,000, illustrating the high, positive skew of the distribution. 
 We also measured the population density of the communities served by the law 
enforcement agencies in our sample by taking the total population divided by the 
square miles of the jurisdiction. As seen in Table 1, the population density averaged 
2,026 residents per square mile, and the median was just over 1,200 residents per 
square mile, again illustrating the high degree of positive skew in the distribution. To 
place this into context, the population density of cities like Chicago exceeds 12,000 
residents per square mile, and smaller communities like Anchorage have a popula-
tion density of fewer than 153 residents per square mile (2000 U.S. Census).
 The percentage of the population accounted for by white residents in the com-
munities served by each law enforcement agency was also included in the analyses. 
We computed this measure using data from the 2000 census. On average, across 
the agencies included in our sample, 81% of the residents were white, although 
the median was slightly higher (87%) (see Table 1). Further, only about 9% of the 
agencies included in our sample served a population where whites accounted for 
less than one half of the total population. We also obtained information from the 
2000 Census regarding the number of housing units in each community that were 
owner-occupied. On average, 67% of the inhabited housing units were occupied 
by the owner of the property (Table 1). 
 Levels of Crime 
 Information on the extent and nature of drug and violent crime was obtained 
from the UCR. Specifically, the reported violent crime rate (combining the num-
ber of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault offenses) was computed, and 
averaged 1,121 offenses per 100,000 residents across the agencies included in our 
sample (Table 1), although the median violent Index offense rate was considerably 
lower, at 722 per 100,000 due to the high degree of skew in the distribution. In ad-
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dition, data regarding the number of drug arrests were also obtained through the 
UCR. However, because the reporting of arrest data, particularly arrest data for 
non-Index crimes (i.e., Part II offenses) is voluntary and not consistent, we were 
only able to obtain drug arrest data for 1,821 of the 2,425 agencies included in the 
LEMAS sample. Further analyses were performed to determine if there appeared to 
be any systematic bias or substantial differences between those agencies we were 
able to obtain drug arrest data for versus those for which data were not available. 
After comparing those agencies that reported drug arrest data to those that did not 
report drug arrest data, we found no statistically significant differences in terms of 
mean population, total officers, officers per capita, and per-capita police expendi-
tures. Rather substantial and statistically significant differences were evident, how-
ever, when the violent crime rate was compared between those police departments 
that reported drug arrests and those that did not. Specifically, those that reported 
drug arrests had much higher violent crime rates than those that did not report drug 
arrests (mean of 1,329 per 100,000 and 494 per 100,000, respectively (F = 209, p < 
.001). Further, among those agencies that reported both violent Index offenses and 
drug arrests, there was a high correlation between violent crime and drug arrest rates 
(Spearman’s rho = .61, p < .001). Thus, because of the potential sampling bias that 
would result from excluding those agencies that did not report drug arrests through 
the UCR, combined with the potential of introducing multicolinearity into our re-
gression analyses due to the relatively high degree of correlation between the drug 
arrest and violent crime rates, we decided to use only the reported violent crime rate 
as an independent variable for the crime level in our analyses.
* Analytic Methods 
The methods of analyses used in the current research include both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. Bivariate analyses were performed to examine the direction 
and strength of the statistical relationship between the dependent variables and the 
independent variables, as well as the degree of correlation among the independent 
variables. Because most of the variables displayed a high degree of skew (as sum-
marized in Table 1), and all variables were either dichotomous or interval/ratio-level 
measures, Spearman’s rho was used to examine the bivariate relationships among the 
variables (Table 2). For the multivariate analyses, logistic regression was used in the 
models to examine the relationship between the independent variables and the de-
pendent variables measuring the existence of a drug unit/participation in a drug task 
force because of the dichotomous nature of these dependent variables (i.e., dichoto-
mous variables indicating the presence or absence of a full-time drug unit—Model 
1—or participation in a drug task force—Model 3). Using logistic regression allowed 
us to statistically isolate the effect of each independent variable on the operation of 
a drug unit or participation in a drug task force, after statistically controlling for the 
influence of the other independent variables. Thus, the coefficients for the independent 
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*  Table 2
Correlation Between Independent Variables & Dependent Variables, Spearman’s Rho
               1              2                3    4      5        6         7            8               9              10 11    12      13         14             15          16         17    
Independent Variables
1.   Jurisdiction Size: Total         1.00
  Population Served                 
2.   Per-Capita Police              0.01       1.00
  Expenditures                 
3.   Per-Capita Offi cers -0.35**  0.71**   1.00              
4.   Total Written Policies (0-15) 0.35**  0.26**       0.10**  1.00             
5.   District Sub-Units                   0.42**  0.08**      -0.04      0.19** 1.00
  (Dichotomous, 0=None, 
  1=1 or More)             
6.   Formal Community Policy       0.29**  0.21**       0.10**    0.32** 0.17** 1.00
  Plan (0=No, 1=Yes)            
7.   Ratio of Full-Time Civilian      0.31**  0.16**      -0.13**       0.19** 0.11** 0.14**  1.00  
  to Offi cers           
8.   County Agency                       0.31** -0.58**     -0.67**       -0.07** 0.14** -0.11** 0.07** 1.00
  (0=Municipal, 1=Sheriff 
  or County Police)         
9.   Population Density               0.17**  0.50**       0.38** 0.22** 0.07** 0.22**  0.06** -0.72** 1.00
  (Residents per square mile)         
10.   Percent of Population White   -0.41** -0.28**      -0.19** -0.25**     -0.24**  -0.22** -0.13** 0.09**  -0.28** 1.00       
11.   Percent of Housing              -0.27**  -0.35**      -0.29**      -0.17**      -0.18** -0.19** -0.09**                       0.37**   -0.51** 0.47**  1.00
  Owner Occupied              
12.   Total Violent Crime Rate        0.11**  0.45**       0.49**       0.19** 0.10** 0.20** 0.10**                     -0.41** 0.30**  -0.37** 0.41** 1.00
  per 100,000 Residents      
13.   Drug Arrest Rate                   -0.14** 0.51**       0.54**       0.12**      -0.02** 0.12** 0.08**         -0.54**   0.36**  -0.28** -0.35** 0.61**  1.00
  per 100,000     
Dependent Variables                 
14.   Has Drug Unit                       0.47**  0.17**       0.04*         0.22**  0.27**      0.23**   0.14**      0.05* 0.15** 0.33** -0.24** 0.27**  0.13**  1.00
  (0=No, 1=Yes)    
15.   Per-capita Full-Time               0.37**      0.23**         0.17**    0.20**    0.23**     0.22** 0.11**                       -0.04 0.17** -0.33** -0.26** 0.32** 0 .22** 0.94**  1.00
  Offi cers to Drug Unit   
16.   Participates in Task Force      0.50**      0.11**      -0.06**        0.21** 0.24**    0.19** 0.17** 0.08** 0.11** -0.26** -0.23** 0.20** 0.02 0.27** 0.22** 1.00
  (0=No, 1=Yes)  
17.   Per-capita Full-Time               0.30**   0.13**   0.05*    0.15** 0.14**     0.13** 0.10**  0.01          0.08**  -0.20** -0.19**  0 .22** 0.09** 0.16** 0.17**   0.90**  1.00  
  Offi cers to Task Force          
* p < .05,  ** p < .01
 
Organizational Approaches to Drug Law Enforcement   •   61
               1              2                3    4      5        6         7            8               9              10 11    12      13         14             15          16         17    
Independent Variables
1.   Jurisdiction Size: Total         1.00
  Population Served                 
2.   Per-Capita Police              0.01       1.00
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8.   County Agency                       0.31** -0.58**     -0.67**       -0.07** 0.14** -0.11** 0.07** 1.00
  (0=Municipal, 1=Sheriff 
  or County Police)         
9.   Population Density               0.17**  0.50**       0.38** 0.22** 0.07** 0.22**  0.06** -0.72** 1.00
  (Residents per square mile)         
10.   Percent of Population White   -0.41** -0.28**      -0.19** -0.25**     -0.24**  -0.22** -0.13** 0.09**  -0.28** 1.00       
11.   Percent of Housing              -0.27**  -0.35**      -0.29**      -0.17**      -0.18** -0.19** -0.09**                       0.37**   -0.51** 0.47**  1.00
  Owner Occupied              
12.   Total Violent Crime Rate        0.11**  0.45**       0.49**       0.19** 0.10** 0.20** 0.10**                     -0.41** 0.30**  -0.37** 0.41** 1.00
  per 100,000 Residents      
13.   Drug Arrest Rate                   -0.14** 0.51**       0.54**       0.12**      -0.02** 0.12** 0.08**         -0.54**   0.36**  -0.28** -0.35** 0.61**  1.00
  per 100,000     
Dependent Variables                 
14.   Has Drug Unit                       0.47**  0.17**       0.04*         0.22**  0.27**      0.23**   0.14**      0.05* 0.15** 0.33** -0.24** 0.27**  0.13**  1.00
  (0=No, 1=Yes)    
15.   Per-capita Full-Time               0.37**      0.23**         0.17**    0.20**    0.23**     0.22** 0.11**                       -0.04 0.17** -0.33** -0.26** 0.32** 0 .22** 0.94**  1.00
  Offi cers to Drug Unit   
16.   Participates in Task Force      0.50**      0.11**      -0.06**        0.21** 0.24**    0.19** 0.17** 0.08** 0.11** -0.26** -0.23** 0.20** 0.02 0.27** 0.22** 1.00
  (0=No, 1=Yes)  
17.   Per-capita Full-Time               0.30**   0.13**   0.05*    0.15** 0.14**     0.13** 0.10**  0.01          0.08**  -0.20** -0.19**  0 .22** 0.09** 0.16** 0.17**   0.90**  1.00  
  Offi cers to Task Force          
* p < .05,  ** p < .01
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variables in the logistic regression models can be interpreted as indicating whether 
they increased, decreased, or had no influence on the likelihood that an agency would 
operate a drug unit or participate in a drug task force. For the analyses involving the 
dependent variables measuring the relative amount of resources committed to drug 
units and drug task forces (i.e., the per-capita number of full-time officers assigned 
to these activities, or Models 2 and 4), ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was 
used. Because these measures of per-capita officers assigned to drug units and drug 
task forces were so highly skewed, log transformations of these variables were per-
formed. Thus, the coefficients for the independent variables in the OLS models can 
be interpreted as the change in the number of officers per capita assigned to drug 
units or drug task forces for each unit change in the independent variable. 
 Although it would have been ideal to perform the analyses using a panel de-
sign (i.e., a cross-section of agencies across multiple points in time), this was not 
possible because each wave of the LEMAS survey includes different agencies in its 
sampling methodology for agencies with fewer than 100 officers. While all agen-
cies with 100 or more officers is included in each wave of the survey, the fact that 
smaller agencies (which may be less likely to operate drug units and participate in 
drug task forces) are samples prevents this temporal dimension of panel analyses. 
Thus, while King (2009) has called for a life-course (longitudinal) view of police 
organizational change, we are limited in this analysis to collecting data at one 
point in time. King’s work describes six important stages in the evolution of police 
organizations: organizational birth, early founding effects, growth, decline, crisis, 
and death. Of the 14,254 law enforcement agencies in the United States, less than 
one half of one percent were begun since 1990 and it is not likely that a declining 
organization will take on a new responsibility (FBI, 2005). Therefore, we would 
argue that the police departments in our sample are in the growth or crisis stage 
of development.  Finally, data are not readily available on when these units were 
formed or when multi-agency task force participation began. 
* Results
In general, the results of the bivariate analyses support the hypotheses regarding 
the existence and direction of the relationships between the independent variables 
and the dependent variables. Summarized in Table 2 are the results of our bivari-
ate analyses, which not only identify a number of strong correlations between the 
independent variables and the two dependent variables using Spearman’s rho, but 
also illustrate some of the potential areas of multicolinearity described above.2 
 
   2Of all the independent variables identified, only two—ratio of civilian staff to officers 
and percent of owner-occupied housing—had distributions that were not highly skewed 
(Table 1). For these, the correlation with the dependent variables employed Pearson’s r. 
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Overall, there were statistically significant correlations, ranging from weak to 
strong, between almost all of the independent variables and the four dependent 
variables. Given the size of the sample involved, the fact that there were statisti-
cally significant correlations is not surprising.
 Summarized in Table 3 are the results of the two multivariate models examin-
ing the factors associated with the operation of a full-time drug unit within de-
partments (Model 1) and the relative amount of resources devoted to drug units 
within departments (Model 2). Overall, there were generally consistent patterns 
seen between the two models both in terms of the existence of a statistically signifi-
cant relationship, the direction of the relationships, and which variables appeared 
to have the largest influence on the dependent variable. Below is a more detailed 
description and interpretation of the results presented in Table 3.3
 With respect to the first variable—the total population served by the agency—
the multivariate analyses for Model 1 (existence of a drug unit) confirmed that the 
larger the population of the jurisdiction, the more likely agencies were to have a 
full-time drug unit, after statistically controlling for the other variables included in 
the model. However, population size did not have a very strong relationship rela-
tive to the other variables, as indicated by the relatively small Wald statistic (3.97).4 
Further, population size did not have any statistical relationship to the number of 
officers per capita assigned to drug units (Model 2). Thus, while population size 
has some influence on the existence of drug units, it is much smaller than indicated 
in the bivariate analyses and relative to other factors, and it did not have any inde-
pendent relationship with the per-capita number of officers assigned to drug units. 
This same pattern was evident when participation in multi-agency drug task forces 
was considered (Models 3 and 4): Population was associated with participation in 
The correlation between full-time drug unit and ratio of civilian to sworn officers was r = 
.08, p < .001, and  the correlation between full-time drug unit and percent of owner-occu-
pied housing was -.25, p < .001. The correlation between full-time participation in a drug 
task force and ratio of civilian to sworn officers was r = .12, p < .001, and the correlation 
between full-time participation in a drug task force and percent of owner-occupied hous-
ing was -.22, p < .001. Thus, the appropriate measure of correlation for all the remaining 
variables was Spearman’s rho, which is presented in Table 2.
   3When the same models presented in Table 3 were rerun and weighted using the 
weights developed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics to produce national estimates, the 
general results did not change (i.e., the same variables remained statistically significant, the 
directions of the relationships remained the same, and there was consistency in terms of 
which variables displayed the strongest relationships to the dependent variables).  
 4The Wald statistic can be used to determine relative strength of variables in a logis-
tic regression model, particularly when the independent variables have different levels of 
measurement. Further, when the variables included in Model 1 were entered using forward 
stepwise regression, the addition of the population variable increased the Nagelkerke R2 
by less than .01.
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multi-agency drug task forces, but had no relationship to the per-capita number of of-
ficers assigned by departments to these task forces (see Table 4). Similarly, the mag-
nitude of effect the population variable had regarding participation in a drug task 
force (Model 3) was small relative to the other variables included in the model.
 On the other hand, the indicator of relative police resources (operationalized 
as per-capita police expenditures) was not statistically associated with either the 
operation of a full-time drug unit (Model 1), per-capita officers assigned to drug 
units (Model 2), participation in a multi-agency drug task force (Model 3), or per-
capita officers assigned to drug task forces (Model 4), after statistically controlling 
for the influence of the other variables included in the model. Thus, while per-capita 
expenditures were positively associated with all of these measures in the bivariate 
analyses, relative resources available was not associated with any of the measures 
of drug enforcement effort once other variables were statistically controlled.
 Among the variables used to operationalize organizational characteristics—
the degree of organizational formality, centralization, and the type of agency (i.e., 
county vs. municipal)—all were statistically significant predictors of the dependent 
variables in all four models. For example, as the number of formal written policies 
(an indicator of the degree of formality) increased, the more likely agencies were to 
operate a drug unit, allocate more officers per capita to drug units, participate in 
a multi-agency drug task force, and allocate more officers per capita to drug task 
forces. Similarly, departments that were decentralized (i.e., had subdistricts/pre-
cincts or had community policing plans) were more likely to operate a drug unit, 
allocate more officers per capita to drug units, participate in a multi-agency drug 
task force, and allocate more officers per capita to drug task forces, after statisti-
cally controlling for the other variables included in the model.  For example, those 
departments that had one or more police districts or precincts were more likely to 
have a drug unit (odds ratio of 1.63) (and allocate more officers per capita to drug 
units [coefficient of .46]), and were more likely to participate in a drug task force 
(odds ratio of 1.49) (and allocate more officers per capita to drug task forces [coef-
ficient of .31]) than those departments with no police districts or precincts. On the 
other hand, one of the proxy measures for task specialization—the ratio of civil-
ian staff to sworn officers—did not reveal a statistically significant, independent 
relationship with the measures of drug unit operation (Models 1 and 2), but was 
a statistically significant predictor of an agency’s participation in a multi-agency 
drug task force (Models 3 and 4). 
 The type of local law enforcement agency (county versus municipal) also pre-
dicted the operation and the number of officers allocated per capita for both drug 
units and task forces, with county-level agencies being more likely than municipal 
departments to operate a drug unit, allocate more officers per capita to those units, 
participate in a drug task force, and allocate more officers per capita to those task 
forces, after statistically controlling for all of the other variables in the models. 
Further, based on the Wald statistic (in logistic Models 1 and 3), and the standard-
ized beta (in OLS Models 2 and 4), whether the agency was a county or municipal 
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department had one of the strongest independent correlations to the dependent 
variables in all four models. 
 The models also reveal a clear relationship between the two approaches to 
drug enforcement (in-house drug unit and participation in a multi-agency drug 
task force): the existence/magnitude of one approach was positively associated 
with the existence/magnitude of the other approach. In other words, agencies that 
operated their own drug unit were more likely to participate in a multi-agency 
drug task force, and the more officers they assigned per capita to one approach, 
the more officers they assigned per capita to another approach.  In fact, in Models 
1 and 3 (measuring the existence of a drug unit and participation in a multi-agency 
drug task force), these were the strongest predictors among the variables included 
in the analyses (Wald of 49.6 and 49.4, respectively).
 Although the findings were relatively consistent in terms of agency character-
istics being associated with both the operation of a drug unit and participation 
in a drug task force, when community population characteristics were examined 
relative to the operation of drug units and participation in drug task forces, some 
fairly substantial differences were evident. For example, the measures of percent 
of the resident population accounted for by whites and percent of housing that 
was owner-occupied were both statistically associated with the operation of a 
drug unit (Model 1) and the number of officers per capita assigned to drug units 
(Model 2) after statistically controlling for the other variables in the models. Spe-
cifically, the larger the proportion of the population accounted for by whites and 
the larger the percent of owner-occupied housing, the lower the likelihood of oper-
ating a drug unit (as indicated by the negative sign of the coefficient and the odds 
ratio being less than 1.0 in Model 1), and the fewer officers per capita assigned to 
these units (Model 2). On the other hand, the percent of the population accounted 
for by whites had no statistically significant relationship to an agency’s participa-
tion in a multi-agency drug task force (Model 3) or the number of officers per 
capita assigned to these task forces (Model 4) after statistically controlling for the 
other variables included in the models. As with in-house drug unit operations, the 
higher the percent of owner-occupied housing, the lower the likelihood of partici-
pating in a drug task force (Model 3), and the fewer officers per capita assigned to 
these task forces (Model 4). 
 A consistent pattern was noted between the variable indicating if the agency 
was within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and their drug enforcement ef-
forts: agencies within an MSA were more likely to operate a drug unit and allocate 
more officers per capita to these units, and were more likely to participate in a drug 
task force and also allocate more officers per capita to these task forces. Also, popu-
lation density had no statistically significant association in any of the models.
 Finally, the violent crime rate was also positively related to all four measures 
of drug enforcement effort (Models 1 through 4). Departments experiencing higher 
rates of violent crime were more likely to operate a drug unit, allocate more of-
ficers per capita to these units, participate in a multi-agency drug task force, and 
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allocate more officers per-capita to these task forces than those with lower violent 
crime rates. The violent crime rate had the strongest (Model 2) or second strongest 
(Model 1) relationship to the dependent variables examining in-house drug units 
(based on the Wald and standardized beta), and in the models examining multi-
agency drug task force participation (Models 3 and 4), the strength of the violent 
crime rate was among the top four strongest in each model. 
* Discussion and Conclusions
Drug law enforcement has become one of the primary duties of local police 
agencies in the United States, and arrests for drug law violations account for a 
substantial proportion of arrests made by these agencies (i.e., 13% of all arrests 
reported to the FBI in 2007 were for drug offenses). In response, police depart-
ments throughout the nation have considered the formation of specialized drug 
enforcement units and participation in multi-agency drug task forces as possible 
ways to respond to this challenge, but a relatively small percent of agencies oper-
ate drug units or participate in multi-agency drug task forces. Using data from 
2,425 local law enforcement agencies, we examined the factors related to police 
departments operating specialized drug enforcement units and/or participating in 
multi-jurisdictional drug task forces. Generally speaking, we found a number of 
characteristics predictive of these decisions by local law enforcement administra-
tors and policy makers, many of which are consistent with the varied literature 
on police organizational structures. However, the overall explanatory power of 
the variables included in the analyses was quite limited, which may suggest more 
nuanced and idiosyncratic forces behind the formation and staffing of these drug 
enforcement efforts. 
 Still, the research provides some insight into the extent to which local law 
enforcement agencies engage in these specific approaches to drug control, and the 
number of officers they assign to these efforts. By far the most influential variables 
in the analyses to explain the approach agencies take in terms of drug enforcement 
was whether the agency participated in other drug enforcement efforts (drug unit 
or task force), if the agency was county-level, the level of violent crime, and orga-
nizational formality and decentralization.  Importantly, jurisdictions with higher 
levels of violence were more likely to operate their own specialized drug enforce-
ment units and participate in drug task forces, and allocate more officers per capita 
to these efforts, which supports rational systems theory. Because of the difficulty 
associated with reliably measuring the extent and nature of a drug problem within 
a community, for both researchers and practitioners, agencies are likely to use the 
next best proxy for this—reported crimes of violence—when making decisions 
about resource allocations.
 Similarly, we found measures of organizational formality and decentraliza-
tion to be predictive of operating drug units and participation in drug task forces. 
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These characteristics generally give rise to increasing differentiation and play a 
crucial role in determining organizational structure and task differentiation. How-
ever, contrary to our expectations, available resources (as measured by per-capita 
police expenditures) were not associated with either drug enforcement response by 
local law enforcement agencies: Just having more money per capita to spend did 
not translate into police departments’ being more or less likely to operate a drug 
unit or participate in a drug task force, or allocate more officers to these efforts. 
Thus, we found no evidence to support resource dependency theory: Wealthy po-
lice departments were no more or less likely to establish a drug enforcement unit or 
participate in a drug task force, or allocate more officers, than poorer departments 
when other variables were statistically controlled.
 Further, the multivariate analyses reveal the importance of not relying exclu-
sively on bivariate analyses or single measures of drug enforcement effort. For ex-
ample in the bivariate analyses, the size of the jurisdiction served (population) had 
the strongest correlation with the operation of in-house drug units; however, the 
multivariate analyses revealed that the strength of population as an explanatory 
variable was relatively weak once the other variables were taken into account. Fur-
ther, while population size was predictive of the existence of a drug unit/participa-
tion in a multi-agency drug task force (i.e., the dichotomous measures in Models 1 
and 3), population size had no independent relationship to the magnitude of effort 
(i.e., the per-capita officers assigned to a drug unit/task force, Models 2 and 4).
 We also found that county-level agencies were more likely to operate their own 
drug unit and participate in multi-agency drug task forces. Part of this may be at-
tributable to the fact that county police agencies (i.e., sheriff’s offices) oftentimes 
serve as the lead law enforcement agency within a county, and therefore not only 
participate in multi-agency drug task forces, but also may take the lead in forming 
these task forces. The finding that agencies operating drug units were more likely 
to participate in multi-agency drug task forces may simply be an indication of a 
multifaceted approach to drug enforcement, or may reveal a more complex orga-
nizational structure or process related to having officers assigned to multi-agency 
operations. For example, organizationally or for supervisory purposes, some agen-
cies that assign officers full-time to multi-agency task forces may also have them 
designated internally as being within a specialized drug unit, but for practical pur-
poses their work is tied to a multi-agency drug task force.
 Finally, we also found support for the argument that the operation of a drug 
unit within a police department, and how extensively that unit was staffed, may 
be associated with the characteristics of the population served, even after statisti-
cally controlling for factors such as population density, jurisdiction size, agency 
characteristics, and crime levels. For example, racial threat theory would support 
the hypothesis that the larger the proportion of residents who are white, the less 
likely police departments would need to “protect” against racial threat through 
the formation of specialized units, such as drug units, or the number of officers 
assigned to these activities. Although we did not find any relationship between the 
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community’s racial profile and participation in a multi-agency drug task force, we 
did find the racial characteristics of the population served to be associated with 
the operation of a full-time drug unit within local police departments (Model 1) 
and the number of officers per capita assigned to these units (Model 2). A similar 
pattern was found with owner-occupied housing, which may lend support to the 
theory that an increase in the proportion of residents who are seen as criminogenic 
would lead to more of a need for a formalized, and extensive, police response to 
the threat. Thus, as the proportion of housing units lived in by owners increases 
(i.e., fewer renters and more people committed to the community), the operation 
of drug units within departments, participation in drug task forces, and officers 
assigned to these activities decreases. 
 In conclusion, this first attempt to understand the role of organizational and 
community characteristics in the decision by local law enforcement agencies to 
operate their own full-time drug unit and/or participate in a multi-agency drug 
task force, and how many officers they assign to these functions, has provided 
some important findings and can, hopefully, lay the foundation for future analy-
ses. One of the biggest limitations with the current analyses is the inability to mea-
sure the extent and nature of the drug problem across the communities included 
in the sample. Part of this is due to the limited, and apparently non-representative, 
reporting of drug arrests by local law enforcement agencies to the UCR program. 
However, even if there is more complete reporting, the degree to which drug arrests 
would be a reliable and valid measure of a community’s drug problem, or just an 
indicator of differential law enforcement focus or effectiveness, would remain an 
unanswered question. In addition, despite using 13 different independent variables 
from multiple sources and measuring unique characteristics of police departments 
and jurisdictions served, the overall explanatory power of the multivariate models 
was quite low. This would suggest that understanding the formation and staffing 
of these types of drug enforcement efforts by local police departments may require 
in-depth case studies and qualitative methods to more fully reveal the forces be-
hind these decisions.
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